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Abstract. How many years will the average transition economy need to
reach the income level of the average OECD country? The favored
methodology in use to answer such questions is referred to as the BLR
approach, because it uses specifications from Barro, and Levine and Renelt.
The literature has so far refrained from identifying and testing the
underlying assumptions of the BLR approach. This paper attempts to fill
this gap. Our results contrast sharply with the assumptions and findings
from the BLR approach, questioning its might and challenging our
understanding of the transition process in its key dimension.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How many years will the average transition economy need to reach the income level
of the average OECD country? What will be the average growth rates of the transition
economies for the next thirty years? How fast will the average transition economy “catch-up”
with the poorest members of the European Union? How long will it take for all the “command
economy features” to disappear from these economies? And once they disappear, which
transition economies need be treated as developing countries? These are important inter-
related questions. And difficult ones too because the transition experience, paradoxically,
justifies and entraps the available answers. It justifies them by appealing to the fact that
transition is temporary: after a while, the standard set of growth determinants will take over.
On the other hand, the uniqueness of the transition experience entraps the available answers
because it questions whether and how fast the transition —as well as the remaining
command— features will disappear.
1
The focus of the burgeoning literature addressing these questions is on growth
prospects and hence concerns estimating, or forecasting, long-run growth rates. The
methodology favored in this literature is here referred to as the Barro-Levine-Renelt
(hereafter, BLR) approach. It proceeds in two steps, first coefficients from growth regressions
(on large samples of developing countries) are estimated (or taken from specifications found
in Barro, 1991, and/or Levine and Renelt, 1992), and second these coefficients are imposed
                                                       
1  Fisher et al. (1996a) point out that “a useful way to think about the current growth prospects of the
transition economies is to consider them subject to two sets of forces: those arising from the transition
and transformation process, and the basic neoclassical determinants of growth. The further along a
country is in the transition process, the less weight on the factors that determine the transitional growth
rate, and the greater the weight on the standard determinants of growth” (p. 231).2
on transition economies’ cross-sectional data. The literature refrained from highlighting and
testing the assumptions buttressing the BLR approach. This paper attempts to fill this gap.
The objective of this paper is to discuss the limitations of the available methods for
assessing the growth prospects transition economies face, and by doing so, investigate long-
run economic growth determinants in these economies.
2 The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews the literature on the growth prospects the transition countries face. Section
3 critically details the mechanics of the BLR approach. Section 4 presents the data on
transition economies used to re-estimate the BLR equations, in Section 5. Our results contrast
sharply with the assumptions and findings from the BLR approach, questioning its might and
challenging our understanding of the transition process in its key dimension. Section 6
concludes.
2. RELATED STUDIES
The objective of this section is to review the literature on the growth prospects the
transition economies face. The emphasis is on cross-country studies, in particular, those
paying attention not only to Central and Eastern Europe but also to former Soviet Union
countries.
The first systematic analysis of growth prospects of transition economies, to the best
of our knowledge, appeared in the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 1996) in the chapter
“Long-Term Growth Potential in the Countries in Transition”. It uses the BLR approach to
simulate the effects of lowering the share of public expenditures (except on education) to 15
                                                       
2  For excellent surveys of the growth literature, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Aghion and
Howitt (1998). On econometric methodology and empirical evidence see Islam (1995), Lee et al.
(1997, 1998), Temple (1999) and Durlauf and Quah (1999).  For a survey of the literature on growth
in transition, see Campos and Coricelli (2000).3
percent of GDP and of raising investment rates to 30 percent of GDP. Not surprisingly, it
finds that both changes would increase growth substantially.
Havlik (1996) bypasses the BLR approach by assuming a growth rate differential in
real per capita GDP of 3 percentage points between the CEEC-7
3 and the European Union
average. The question is: given the 1995 levels of real per capita GDP, how many years will
the CEEC-7 countries need to catch-up with the EU or, more likely, with its poorer members?
Havlik concludes that “convergence between the two most advanced CEEC countries and
Spain (…) could not happen before 2005. For the other CEEC members to converge to the
EU average by 2010 would require a growth differential of more than 5 per cent, a highly
unrealistic assumption” (1996, pp.42-44).
Denizer (1997) stresses that initial conditions matter, as proxied by distance (in miles)
from Vienna and whether the country was independent before socialism. For growth
prospects, Denizer opts for using only the Levine-Renelt specification on the basis that it
“includes variables that are shown to be robust in various specifications of the growth
equation” (1997, p. 13). In addition, Denizer extends previous analyses by considering a
broader sample of transition economies (adding Mongolia, China and Vietnam). Finally, as a
simulation exercise, he evaluates the impact of raising the investment rate to 30 percent from
current levels on the number of years these economies will need to reach current OECD
income levels.
One important contribution to this literature is made in the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development’s Transition Report 1997  (EBRD, 1997, chapter 6). This
Report contrasts the findings on the transition economies’ growth prospects that originate
from the Levine-Renelt specification with those that originate from an alternative
                                                       
3 CEEC-7 is Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.4
specification that includes, inter alia, an index of institutional development.
4 This suggests a
downward revision of the forecasted long-run growth rates: even for those transition
economies with relatively high-quality institutions (and for which, institutional data are
available), the absence of further institutional change should lower long-term growth rates by
1.5 percentage points.
Fisher, Sahay and Vegh (1997) use coefficients from Barro (1991) and from Levine
and Renelt (1992) and cross-sectional data (for 1994) from 15 transition economies to
forecast GDP and per capita GDP growth rates. They also conduct two simulation exercises.
The first uses the Barro coefficients to investigate the consequences (in terms of the number
of years needed to reach current OECD income levels) of lowering government consumption
from current levels to 10 percent of GDP. The second uses the Levine and Renelt
specification to look at the impact on growth of raising the investment rate to 30 percent of
GDP from current levels.  In subsequent work (1998), the authors use the BLR approach for a
smaller sample of transition economies (Central European and Baltic countries) to assess their
catching-up prospects with the European Union.
 They carry out two simulation exercises to
estimate the number of years it will be needed to these transition economies to converge to the
income levels of the three “low-income EU countries,” Greece, Portugal and Spain,  assuming
that the latter will grow at 2 per cent per annum. The first simulation uses the Barro
specification to investigate the consequences of lowering government consumption from
current levels to 10 percent of GDP. The second uses the Levine and Renelt specification to
look at the impact on growth of raising the investment rate to 30 percent of GDP, from its
                                                       
4  This composite index encompasses  “expropriation risk”, “rule of law”, “risk of contract repudiation
by the government”, “corruption”, and “quality of the bureaucracy” (EBRD, 1997, p. 106). The
“enlarged” Levine-Renelt specification includes enrollment rates in primary school, changes in
international prices, and growth of labor force (instead of population growth).5
current levels. One innovation this paper brings is a quantification of the income losses
incurred during the socialist period: using 1937 data for 6 countries, they estimate that
approximately two-thirds of GDP per capita were lost during the socialist experiment.
There are a number of important studies focusing on smaller samples of transition
countries. Borenzstein and Montiel (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1996) both examine only
three transition countries. The former uses the Mankiw-Romer-Weil framework to identify
long term growth paths, while the latter uses three countries’ experience to argue that
harmonizing with the European Union policy standards will result in lower growth rates than
following the policies of the group the authors define as “very fast growing developing
economies.” Barbone and Zalduendo (1997) modify the BLR approach in that they estimate
their own theoretical model for a large sample of developing countries and then use the
coefficients to discuss accession to the European Union of five candidates.
5
3. THE BLR APPROACH
The BLR approach is ubiquitous. This section discusses it in detail. The BLR
approach consists of two steps. First, the coefficients from growth regressions on large
samples of developing countries are estimated or, more often, “taken” from Barro (1991)
and/or Levine and Renelt (1992). The “Barro equation” (and the ordinary least squares
estimates) used in the papers reviewed above is:
                ^
GDPGROWTH = 0.0302 –0.0075 * Y0 + 0.025 * PRIM + 0.0305 * SEC -0.119 * GOV,
while the “Levine and Renelt equation” (and the ordinary least squares estimates)  is:
                             ^
GDPGROWTH = - 0.83  - 0.35 * Y0 – 0.38 * POP + 3.17 * SEC + 17.5 * INV,
                                                       
5  See also Barta and Url (1996) and Fidrmuc (2000).6
where GDPGROWTH is per capita real GDP growth, Y0 is the initial level of per capita
income, PRIM is the gross primary school enrollment rate, SEC is the gross secondary school
enrollment rate, POP is the rate of population growth, GOV is the share of government
consumption in GDP, and INV is the share of investment in GDP.
The second step in the BLR approach is to impose these coefficients on transition
economies’ data in the following manner. First, data for a set of transition economies are
collected on all BLR variables, often for 1994 or 1995. Second, these values are, for each
country, multiplied by their respective coefficients and summed to the constant term. The
result is the estimated long-run growth rate.
The long-run growth rates the BLR approach generates average 5.2 percent and range
from 1.8 percent (Bulgaria) to 11.57 percent (Turkmenistan). These rates are clearly too high
and this is because transition economies have higher stocks of physical and human capital and
lower rates of population growth vis-à-vis the market economies, at similar levels of
development, upon which those least squares coefficients are estimated. By imposing these
regression coefficients on transition economies’ data, the approach implicitly assumes that the
transition countries are structurally identical to market economies at similar levels of
development. Indeed, that this crucial assumption remains untested is a major  limitation of
the BLR approach.
6 In order to test this assumption, one needs to estimate the BLR equations
                                                       
6 There are some other important problems. What the literature calls the “Barro specification” can not
be found in Barro’s 1991 paper. There is one specification that contains the coefficients shown above
(equation 1 in Table 1, pp. 410-11), but it contains three other variables: the sum of the number of
revolutions and coups per year, the number of political assassinations per capita per year, and “the
magnitude of the deviation of the 1960 PPP value for the investment deflator (U.S.=1) from the
sample mean” (Barro, 1991). Although the “Levine and Renelt specification” is in their 1992 paper,
this specification does not solely includes variables that are robust in explaining growth. Indeed, the7
using transition countries’ data. If the resulting coefficients are similar to the ones presented
above, then the approach is fully justified.
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data set constructed for this paper contains all the variables in the two equations
underlying the BLR approach —namely, initial per capita income, per capita GDP growth
rates, population growth,
7 gross domestic investment (as a share of GDP), gross enrollment
ratios in primary and secondary school, and general government expenditures and
consumption (as a share of GDP)— and covers the period 1989 to 1998. Table 1 gives basic
statistics, sources, coverage, and number of missing observations per series, Table 2 shows
the countries in the sample, and Table 3 has the correlation matrix.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
A caveat about data quality and comparability is needed. These problems are many
and are well documented (Bartholdy, 1997). Socialist statistical offices had a comparative
advantage in measuring quantities, and were ill equipped to deal with issues like price
changes (let alone inflation) and unemployment. Moreover, the systemic transformation
meant a radical change in incentives from fulfilling plan targets to evading taxes, from over-
reporting to under-reporting output. The combination of these difficulties in measuring
quantity and prices has led De Broeck and Koen to note that, in transition, there is no “single,
true real GDP series” (2000). Last, but not least, the initial years of the transition witnessed an
                                                                                                                                                                            
results in Levine and Renelt’s Table 1 (1992, p. 947) indicate that population growth is not a “robust”
growth determinant.
7  Notice that population growth does not fully reflect changes in the labor force caused by inter alia
differences in participation rates and migration. The latter was sizeable in some countries in the early
1990s, like Albania or Armenia. I am thankful to an anonymous referee for the latter point.8
extraordinary explosion in size of the “hidden” economy. All these factors should be kept in
mind when examining the results below.
One difficulty in identifying which countries are “at similar levels of development” is
that while the transition economies started out clustered in the “upper-middle income” group
8,
ten years later they are found widely spread over the rank of countries (by their level of
development). This can be fully grasped if we name the “new neighbors” of the transition
economies.
 Among transition countries, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic have the lowest
GDP per capita in 1998 (followed by Moldova),
 while Slovenia has the highest (followed by
the Czech Republic and Croatia, respectively). The “median” transition economy is
Kazakhstan. Bangladesh is the developing country with the same GNP per capita in 1998 as
Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Haiti and Mauritania are the countries with the same
GNP per capita in 1998 as Moldova. At the other extreme of this distribution, the country
immediately above Slovenia is Portugal,
 and the one immediately below is Argentina. The
Czech Republic ranks between Uruguay and Chile, while Croatia ranks between Brazil and
Hungary.  The dispersion in the transition group increased substantially since 1989 and this
list of countries in close positions clarifies the difficulty in establishing the relevant
comparators or groups of countries at similar levels of development.
9 Most of the former
                                                       
8  The World Bank ranks countries by their level of economic development, using as criterion (1998)
GNP per capita (exchange rates conversion). “The groups are: low-income, $760 or less; lower-
middle-income, $761-$3,030; upper-middle-income, $3,031-$9,630; and high-income: $9,361 or
more” (World Bank, 1999/2000  World Development Report, p. 291). According to this Report,
Slovenia is the only “high income” country in this sample of 25 transition economies.
9 As for levels of development, one can argue that income per capita alone does not do justice to the
years of effort to improve social conditions (e.g., education and health) that characterized the socialist
regimes. UNDP (1998) ranks 174 countries according to their “human development index” (which9
Soviet Union countries end this period as “low income” or “lower-middle income,” while the
majority of the Central and Eastern Europeans (and Baltic) countries in the late 1990s are
classified as “upper-middle income” economies.
  Clearly, dispersion increased because of large differences in performance. Table 2
shows annual real GDP growth rates. A few remarks are in order. First, as it can be seen from
the last column, so far only three countries have surpassed the 1989 level of per capita GDP.
Second, the countries of Eastern Europe experienced output declines that turned out to be
much smaller than the ones observed, at a later date, among the CIS economies. And finally,
there seems to be a “Baltic puzzle”: although Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all had output
contractions comparable to other CIS countries, their recovery was much faster.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
  What can explain these differences? The expectation is that at least part of the answer
can be found in the variables underlying the BLR approach, namely in investment rates,
population growth, school enrollment ratios,
10 and government consumption. Two remarks:
one is that this set of variables does not fully capture policy differences, at least not as
commonly understood in the literature reviewed above.  The other refers to the share of
government consumption in GDP. In the study of the effects of government consensus is
                                                                                                                                                                            
reflects, in addition to income, life expectancy and education attainment.) This sample of 25 transition
economies stretches from the 37
th (Slovenia, immediately preceded by Argentina and followed by
Uruguay) to the 118
th place (Tajikistan, immediately preceded by Cape Verde and followed by
Honduras). The median country is Macedonia (in 80
th place), immediately preceded by Lithuania and
followed by Syria. In sum, the dispersion seems to have increased also along these lines.
10 These are gross enrollment rates for “basic education” (ISCED 1 and 2)  and “secondary education”
(ISCED 3). The former is often called "compulsory schooling" and normally lasts from age 6 or 7 to
age 14 or 15. Often divided into primary (to age 10) and lower secondary levels.10
being built upon the notion that different types of expenditures have different effects on
economic growth.
11 Yet notice that in the BLR approach (in the “Barro specification” in
particular) it enters with a negative sign.
The BLR approach confines methodological choices: the two equations are to be
estimated by ordinary least squares on cross-sectional data, correcting for heteroscedasticity.
However, restricting the analysis to the cross-sectional dimension (or not extending it into the
time-series dimension) clearly does no justice to “transition.” How can we take into account
“transition features” without leaving the BLR framework? In other words, how can we allow
for the typically V-shaped short-run output dynamics as well as for the effects of different
policy choices without adding variables? One solution is to re-base the BLR variables on
different time scales,
12 another is to estimate the BLR equations for downturn and recovery
phases separately. These allow using pooled OLS while attending to problems of simultaneity
(between growth and policies as discussed by Heybey and Murrell, 1999), omitted variables
as well as the capture of the “phase effect.”
                                                       
11 See Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) and references therein. Analyses focusing on transition
economies include Chu and Schwartz (1994) and Campos and Coricelli (2000).
12 The results discussed in the next section were subjected to four different of time scales: the first is
“transition time” from Berg et al. (1999) with year zero denoting the “year in which central planning
was decisively abandoned.” The second is “years of transition” following Blanchard (1997), with year
one indicating the year of the most significant fall in industrial output. Note that Blanchard studies just
a few countries, so data from the U.N Economic Commission for Europe (1996) were used to identify
this year for the complete sample. The third is “post-reform time” from Aslund et al. (1996), with zero
marking the year of most intense reform. The fourth and last time scale used was “stabilization time”
from Fisher et al. (1998), with year zero being the year of the introduction of the stabilization program.11
5. BACK TO THE FUTURE
The objective of this section is to estimate the equations underlying the BLR approach
using the data set discussed above. It is important to keep in mind that the results that follow
are not extremely robust: the exclusion of certain countries in some runs, or the inclusion of
some variables in certain specifications, alters the statistical significance levels of many
coefficients. Therefore, we found it important to report in addition to the “original BLR
equations,” results for a number of stripped as well as enlarged versions of these equations to
allow some latitude in judgement.
We start by exploring the cross-sectional dimension of our data set, for the case of the
“Barro specification” (Table 4). We follow Barro (1991) and report ordinary least squares
estimates on averages for all variables over the period 1990-1998. Reading the table from top
to bottom, notice first the rather few statistically significant coefficients. This is surprising
because, after all, these variables have been identified as long-run (growth) determinants and
one would expect that they would play a role, at least in a cross-sectional frame. Examining
the individual columns (variables), notice that the sign of the initial income coefficient is
positive (although not often statistically significant) in all five specifications contrary to the
expectation nested in the BLR approach. On the positive side, basic education carries the
expected sign and is statistically significant throughout.
13 Although not statistically
significant, it is interesting to note that both “secondary education” and “government
consumption” carry signs that are in stark contrast to the signs postulated by the BLR
approach.
14 Also worth mentioning is that the CIS dummy variable (which assumes the value
                                                       
13 However, if UNESCO or World Bank primary education figures are used instead, the coefficient
becomes statistically insignificant. These are available from the author upon request.
14  If instead of government consumption, government expenditures is used, the relevant coefficient
becomes statistically significant (and remains positive).These results are available from the author12
of 1 for CIS countries, and zero otherwise) carries the expected sign and is statistically
significant.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Table 5 shows results for the cross-sectional dimension of the “Levine and Renelt
specification.” Once again, the lack of statistically significant coefficients is evident. One
exception is the coefficient on initial income, but it carries an unexpected positive sign and is
statistically significant in the first two specifications. The sign for secondary education is also
opposite to what we should expect from the BLR approach. Notice that the introduction of the
CIS dummy (a step known to quiver most of the results in the literature) turns the coefficient
on investment into statistical significance (a very rare result in the literature).
 15
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Because the results above vigorously contradict the BLR findings, it is worth giving
the data one more chance. This is accomplished by exploring the time-series dimension in the
data in order to investigate whether in a shorter-run frame the BLR results would appear. The
explicit cost of this choice is that the theoretical underpinnings that were guiding the previous
findings do not hold here. The theory associated with the BLR equations focuses on the
determinants of long-run economic growth and has very little to say about short-term
fluctuations, making the findings that follow exploratory.
Table 6 shows how the Barro specification performs for a pooled ordinary least
squares estimation on cross-section time-series annual data. The first noteworthy result is that
the coefficient on initial income is always positive and (in one equation) statistically
                                                                                                                                                                            
upon request.
15 Notice that these results do not change in any meaningful way for the two BLR equations if these
averages are calculated only for the recovery period. These are available from the author upon request.13
significant (against the BLR expectation). Note that the CIS dummy variable still carries the
expected sign and is statistically significant. The major changes, vis-à-vis the cross-sectional
results above, are that the coefficient on basic education is not statistically significant and the
coefficient on secondary education becomes statistically significant (and shows the expected
positive sign).
16
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Table 7 shows how the Levine and Renelt specification performs for cross-section
time-series data. In light of our other results, it performs rather well and despite the very low
Adjusted-R
2’s,  only one coefficient carries the unexpected sign (namely the one for initial
income). The coefficients on secondary education, investment and on the CIS dummy are all
statistically significant and carry the expected signs.
17
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Until now, the analysis has not fully taken into account the “transition features”
previously mentioned. In order to allow for the typically V-shaped short-run output dynamics
as well as for the effects of different policy choices without leaving the BLR framework we
estimate the BLR equations for downturn and recovery phases separately.
18
                                                       
16  The results for data re-based using any of the four different time scales discussed in the previous
section are qualitatively similar to these. They are not reported for the sake of space but are available
from the author upon request.
17  Notice that if UNESCO secondary education figures are used instead, the coefficient on secondary
school and investment become statistically insignificant (and adding the CIS dummy makes only the
coefficient on investment statistically significant). If World Bank secondary education figures are used
instead, the coefficient on secondary school becomes statistically significant, but it carries a negative
sign. These results are available from the author upon request.
18 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for these suggestions.14
Tables 8 and 9 show how the Barro’s specification perform for the downturn and
recovery phases, respectively. One first issue to notice is that the coefficients on secondary
education and, surprisingly, the CIS dummy are statistically insignificant in the downturn as
well as in the recovery. Also interesting is that that the coefficient of government
consumption is always positive (although statistically significant only during the downturn
phase) and that the coefficient on “basic education” is positive in the downturn (and often
statistically significant) but negative in the recovery (also often statistically significant).
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here]
Finally, Tables10  and 11 show how the Levine and Renelt’s specification perform for
the downturn and recovery phases, respectively. One first observation is the complete absence
of statistically significant coefficients for the recovery phase. Also notice that when one
separates downturn from recovery, the CIS looses explanatory power considerably. Last, it is
noteworthy that the coefficient on investment is positive and statistically significant in the
downturn, but in the recovery it is never statistically significant.
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here]
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The objective of this paper was to discuss the limitations of the available methods for
assessing the growth prospects transition economies face and, in doing so, investigate growth
determinants for these economies.
 We surveyed the literature and identified the BLR approach
as the favored methodology in use to estimate or forecast long-run growth rates in transition
economies. Closer examination revealed many problems with  the approach, to which the
literature does not seem attentive. In particular, a crucial assumption remain untested, namely
that the transition countries are structurally identical to market economies at similar levels of
development. In this paper, we tested it and found little evidence in its support. As for the15
BLR approach as a whole, we found that the coefficients in the BLR equations vary widely
when estimated on transition countries’ data. There are indeed very few robust results. There
is some evidence that higher initial incomes are associated with higher rates of economic
growth and there is also some evidence that basic education and investment have also been
positively associated with economic growth. However, these are clearly exceptions: the BLR
approach does not perform well for the transition countries at all. This strengthens the case
for making its costs and shortcomings explicit all the more pressing.16
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Table 1
Basic statistics, sources, and coverage
Variables Period Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum No. Missing Source(s)
GNP per capita PPP, US$ 1989 5593 2111.8 1400 9200 0 De Melo, Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev, (1997)
GDP per capita, current
dollars
1989 2668 1397.3 723 6052 0 WDI 2000 and ECE 1995
GDP per capita, current
dollars
1990-1998 2135 1784.5 220 9851 5 WDI 2000, and ECE 1995.
GDP growth, annual, % 1990-1998 -4.3 10.2 -52.6 12.7 0 EBRD
Gross primary school
enrollment  (1), %
1990-1995 94.8 9.1 76.0 118.0 94 UNESCO (1997)
Gross primary school
enrollment  (2), %
1990-1996 96.0 8.7 75.9 121.8 76 WDI 2000
Basic education gross
enrollment, (3) %
1990-1998 91.6 5.1 78.8 99.8 11 UNICEF’s TransMONEE
Gross secondary school
enrollment, (1) %
1990-1995 80.8 12.9 35.0 102.0 84 UNESCO (1997)
Gross secondary school
enrollment, (2) %
1990-1997 85.1 11.8 37.5 103.8 76 WDI 2000
General secondary gross
enrollment, (3) %
1990-1998 26.5 7.6 8.8 45.6 15 UNICEF’s TransMONEE
Gross domestic fixed
investment, % GDP
1990-1998 20.7 7.0 1.6 44.3 25 WDI 2000, WDI, WDR
Population growth, annual,
%
1990-1998 0.2 1.2 -4.9 6.9 0 WDI 2000
Government consumption,
% GDP
1990-1998 17.6 5.0 5.9 29.4 16 WDI 2000, WDR
Government expenditure, %
GDP
1990-1998 39.3 11.6 10.4 82.9 26 UNICEF’s TransMONEE20
Table 2
25 Transition Countries, initial (1989) GNP level and growth rates
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Estimated level
PPP level of real GDP in 1998 (1989=100)
Albania 1400 -10.0 -27.7 -7.2 9.6 9.4 8.9 9.1 -7.0 8.0 86
Bulgaria 5000 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.1 -7.0 3.5 66
Croatia 6171 -7.1 -21.1 -11.7 -8.0 5.9 6.8 6.0 6.5 2.3 78
Czech Republic 8600 -1.2 -11.5 -3.3 0.6 3.2 6.4 3.8 0.3 -2.3 95
Estonia 8900 -8.1 -13.6 -14.2 -9.0 -2.0 4.3 3.9 10.6 4.0 76
Macedonia 3394 -9.9 -7.0 -8.0 -9.1 -1.8 -1.2 0.8 1.5 2.9 72
Hungary 6810 -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 5.1 95
Latvia 8590 2.9 -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.6 59
Lithuania 6430 -5.0 -6.2 -21.3 -16.0 -9.5 3.5 4.9 7.4 5.2 65
Poland 5150 -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 4.8 117
Romania 3470 -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 4.1 -6.9 -7.3 76
Slovakia 7600 -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4 100
Slovenia 9200 -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.9 104
CEEB -6.6 -10.7 -3.6 0.4 3.9 5.5 4.0 3.6 2.4 95
Armenia 5530 -7.4 -17.1 -52.6 -14.8 5.4 6.9 5.8 3.1 7.2 41
Azerbaijan 4620 -11.7 -0.7 -22.6 -23.1 -19.7 -11.8 1.3 5.8 10.1 44
Belarus 7010 -3.0 -1.2 -9.6 -7.6 -12.6 -10.4 2.8 10.4 8.3 78
Georgia 5590 -12.4 -20.6 -44.8 -25.4 -11.4 2.4 10.5 110 2.9 33
Kazakhstan 5130 -0.4 -13.0 -2.9 -9.2 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 2.0 -2.5 61
Kyrgyztan 3180 3.0 -5.0 -19.0 -16.0 -20.0 -5.4 7.1 9.9 1.8 60
Moldova 4670 -2.4 -17.5 -29.1 -1.2 -31.2 -3.0 -8.0 1.3 -8.6 32
Russia 7720 -4.0 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.5 0.8 -4.6 55
Tajikistan 3010 -1.6 -7.1 -29.0 -11.0 -18.9 -12.5 -4.4 1.7 5.3 42
Turkmenistan 4230 2.0 -4.7 -5.3 -10.0 -18.8 -8.2 -8.0 -26.1 4.2 44
Ukraine 5680 -3.4 -11.6 -13.7 -14.2 -23.0 -12.2 -10.0 -3.2 -1.7 37
Uzbekistan 2740 1.6 -0.5 -11.1 -2.3 -4.2 -0.9 1.6 2.4 3.3 90
C I S -3.7 -6.0 -14.2 -9.3 -13.8 -5.2 -3.5 0.9 -3.5 53
ALL -5.0 -8.1 -9.5 -5.0 -6.0 -0.5 -0.2 2.0 -1.2 65
Source: see text.21
Table 3



















0.4126 0.3682 0.1348 -0.1941
Government
Expenditures
0.3223 0.6009 0.4905 -0.3569 0.4499
CIS dummy -0.3906 -0.6389 -0.5011 0.2319 -0.2249 -0.4622
Investment 0.2473 0.3099 0.4591 -0.0873 0.3446 0.3327 0.0019
Population growth -0.5327 -0.1450 -0.3084 0.1333 -0.0288 -0.1077 0.5196 0.135522
Table 4
Cross sectional dimension, Barro specification
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Notes: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level,  ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * denotes statistically
significant at the 10% level. In the first rows are the coefficients, and below are standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity).23
Table 5
Cross sectional dimension, Levine and Renelt  specification
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Notes: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level,  ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * denotes statistically
Significant at the 10% level. In the first rows are the coefficients, and below are standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity).24
Table 6
Panel dimension, Barro specification
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Notes: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level,  ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * denotes statistically
Significant at the 10% level. In the first rows are the coefficients, and below are standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity).25
Table 7
 Panel dimension, Levine and Renelt  specification
















































Notes: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level,  ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * denotes statistically
Significant at the 10% level. In the first rows are the coefficients, and below are standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity).26
Table 8
Panel dimension, Barro specification, data for downturn only.























































Notes: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level,  ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * denotes statistically
significant at the 10% level. In the first rows are the coefficients, and below are standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity).27
Table 9
Panel dimension, Barro specification, data for recovery only.























































Notes: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level,  ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * denotes statistically
Significant at the 10% level. In the first rows are the coefficients, and below are standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity).28
Table 10
Panel dimension, Levine and Renelt  specification, data for downturn only.





















































Notes: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level,  ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * denotes statistically
Significant at the 10% level. In the first rows are the coefficients, and below are standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity).29
Table 11
Panel dimension, Levine and Renelt  specification, data for recovery only.





















































Notes: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level,  ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * denotes statistically
Significant at the 10% level. In the first rows are the coefficients, and below are standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity).2008
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